Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring
Gerard J. van den Berg
Bas van der KlaauwOctober 2013
Abstract
We structurally estimate job search models explicitly
models with endogenous job search effort and effort monitoring. We
use data from a randomized experiment conducted in the Netherlands
to evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring. This includes
register data on post unemployment outcomes like wages and job
mobility, and survey data on measures of search behavior.
Monitoring causes unemployed workers to accept jobs of lower
quality. Individuals who were exposed to stricter job search
monitoring receive on average lower wages and have shorter job
durations. Adverse effects of monitoring are mitigated by search
channel substitution and on-the-job search. We use the structural
estimates to compare monitoring to other policies against moral
hazard, like re-employment bonuses and changes in the benefits
level.
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Last updated: October 21, 2013.