A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Jonneke Bolhaar
Maarten Lindeboom
Bas van der KlaauwEuropean Economic Review 56, 669-690 (2012).
Abstract
We find that asymmetric information is important for the uptake of supplementary private
health insurance and health care utilization. We use dynamic panel data models to investigate
the sources of asymmetric information and distinguish short-run selection effects into insurance
from long-run selection effects. Short-run selection effects (i.e. responses to shocks) are
adverse, but small in size. Also long-run effects driven by differences in, for example, preferences
and risk aversion, are small. But we find some evidence for multidimensional asymmetric
information. For example, mental health causes advantageous selection. Estimates of health
care utilization models suggest that moral hazard is not important.
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Last updated: April 27, 2012.