Screening Disability Insurance Applications
Philip de Jong
Maarten Lindeboom
Bas van der KlaauwJournal of the European Economic Association 9, 106-129 (2011).
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A largescale
experiment was set up wherein two of the 26 Dutch regions caseworkers of the disability
insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical
results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance
applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during
the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants.
Furthermore, stricter screening improves targeting efficiency without inducing negative spillover
effects on the inflow into unemployment insurance.
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Last updated: January 26, 2011.