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Research Interests:
General: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial
Organization, Law and Economics, Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Regulation, Mathematical Economics, Dynamic Games.
Specific: Economics of crime, Analysis of optimal
policies for deterrence of antitrust law violations, Optimal leniency
schemes, Dynamic models of optimal law enforcement.
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For a
downloadable version of my curriculum vitae please click
here.
Publications:
1. E. Motchenkova and P.M. Kort,
(2006), Analysis of the properties
of the current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law, Journal
of Optimization Theory and Applications, 128(2), 431-451, URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/4430162512326843/fulltext.pdf
2. E. Motchenkova, (2008), Determination of optimal penalties
for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting, European Journal of Operational Research , 189(1), 269-291,
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.05.048
3. E. Motchenkova and D.
Leliefeld, (2010), Adverse effects
of leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry, Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Volume V/ Issue
2(12), 115-129, URL: http://ideas.repec.org/s/ush/jaessh.html
4. H. Houba, Motchenkova
E., and Q. Wen, (2010), Antitrust
enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities, Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.3 pp. 2017-2027, URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I3-P185.pdf
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5. R. Halbersma, M. Mikkers, E. Motchenkova, and I. Seinen,
(2011), Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands, European Journal of Health
Economics, Volume 12, Issue 6, Page 589-603, URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/477hx26326t61467/fulltext.pdf
6. E. Motchenkova and R. van der Laan, (2011), Strictness of leniency programs and
asymmetric punishment effect, International
Review of Economics, Volume 58, Issue 4, Page 401-431, URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/y12261un43vp3014/fulltext.pdf
7. H. Houba, Motchenkova E., and Q. Wen, (2012), Competitive Prices as Optimal Cartel
Prices, Economics Letters, Volume
114, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 39-42, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.021
Working Papers:
Antitrust
Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence, with
H. Houba and Q. Wen, 2011. Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 11-166/1, Tinbergen Institute
Research Joint
Ventures and Price Collusion: Joint Analysis of the Impact of R&D
Subsidies and Antitrust Fines, with O. Rus, VU Serie Research
Memoranda 2011-25, URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1871/23878
Leniency Programs in the Presence of Judicial Errors,
with N. Ghebrihiwet, TILEC Discussion paper 2010-030, URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666111##
The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing, with
H. Houba and Q. Wen, 2009. Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 09-081/1, Tinbergen Institute
Maximal
Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs, with H. Houba
and Q. Wen, 2008. Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 08-120/1, Tinbergen Institute
Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat
Offenders, Working paper, Free University Amsterdam, 2006
(revised 2010), URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/vuarem/2006-8.html
The effects of leniency programs on cartel stability: A timing
game approach, CentER Discussion
paper 2004-98, URL: CentER Discussion paper series 2004-98
(revised July 2009)
Projects:
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Other publications:
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and Q. Wen, 2010, On the Effectiveness of
Leniency Programs in Cartel Enforcement, MET:
Medium Econometrische Toepassingen,
17-4-3, p. 18-23
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and Q. Wen, 2010, On the Effectiveness of
Leniency Programs in Cartel Enforcement, AENORM
(Student Magazine Actuarial Sciences,
Econometrics and Operations Research) 18 (67), p. 23-27
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and
Q. Wen, 2009, The Maximal Damage Paradigm in Antitrust Regulation: Is it Something New?, AENORM 16,
gemeenschappelijke uitgave econometriestudieverenigingen Kraket/VSAE, Vrije Universiteit/Universiteit van
Amsterdam, p.37-41.
Promoting small-scale private enterprises in Russia: the problem of
excessive taxation, Proceedings of the Workshop on Reviving
Russian Economy through the restructuring of incentives, 2001. St-Petersburg,
Russia, pp. 7-10
Education:
2001/08 - 2005/08: Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and
Operations Research, The Netherlands.
PhD student at CentER and TILEC.
Title of the PhD Dissertation: Optimal Enforcement of Competition Law,
Supervisors: Prof. Eric van Damme, Prof. Peter M. Kort.
1999/08 - 2001/06: University of Oslo,
Master degree in Environmental and Development Economics
1995/08 - 1999/06: Saint-Petersburg State University,
Master degree in Mathematical Economics
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