Department of Economics Evgenia Motchenkova
Research
Interests Primary Fields: Industrial
Organization, Law and Economics, Competition Policy and Regulation,
Microeconomics, Game Theory, Dynamic Games Publications: ·
E. Dijk, J.L.
Moraga-Gonzalez, and E. Motchenkova, (2023), “How Do Start-up
Acquisitions Affect the Direction of Innovation?”, Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming ·
H.
Houba, E. Motchenkova, and H. Wang (2023), “Endogenous
Personalized Pricing in the Hotelling Model”,
Economics Letters, 225, February 2023, 111037 ·
J.L.
Moraga-Gonzalez, Motchenkova E., and S. Nevrekar (2022), “Mergers
and Innovation Portfolios”,
RAND Journal of
Economics, 53 (4), 641-677, DP version pdf. · Y. Katsoulacos, Motchenkova E., and D. Ulph, (2020), “Combining Cartel Penalties and Private Damage Actions: The Impact on Cartel Prices”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 73, December 2020, 102604 ·
Y.
Funaki, H. Houba, and E. Motchenkova (2020), “Market power in bilateral
oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures”, International Journal of Game Theory,
49(2), 525-546, DP version pdf ·
Y.
Katsoulacos, Motchenkova E., and D. Ulph, (2020), “Penalising
on the basis of the severity of the offence: A sophisticated revenue-based
cartel penalty”, Review of
Industrial Organization, 57(3), 627-646,
DP version pdf ·
Y.
Katsoulacos, Motchenkova E., and D. Ulph, (2019), “Penalizing cartels—a spectrum of
regimes”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 7 (3),
339–351. ·
E.
Motchenkova and G. Spagnolo, (2019), Leniency
Programs in Antitrust: Practice vs Theory, Competition Policy International, CPI Antitrust Chronicle January 21, 2019 pdf ·
H.
Houba, Motchenkova E., and Q. Wen, (2018), Legal Principles in Antitrust
Enforcement,
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120, 3,
p. 859-893, DP version pdf ·
Y.
Katsoulacos, Motchenkova E., and D. Ulph, (2018), Public
and Private Antitrust Enforcement for Cartels: Should there be a Common
Approach to Sanctioning based on the Overcharge Rate?, Competition Policy
International, CPI
Antitrust Chronicle October 16, 2018 pdf ·
N.
Ghebrihiwet and E. Motchenkova (2017),
Relationship between FDI, foreign ownership
restrictions, and technology transfer in the resources
sector: A derivation approach, Resources
Policy, 52, 320-326. ·
Y.
Katsoulacos, Motchenkova E., and D. Ulph, (2015), Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing
Penalties on Price Overcharge, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 42 (September 2015), pages
70-80. pdf ·
H.
Houba, Motchenkova E., and Q. Wen, (2015), The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing, The B.E.
Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15(2), 351–389. pdf ·
E. Motchenkova (2014), Cost minimizing sequential
punishment policies for repeat offenders, Applied
Economics Letters, 21 (5), 360-365 ·
I. Lianos and E. Motchenkova (2013), Market Dominance and Search
Quality in the Search Engine Market, Journal of
Competition Law and Economics, 9 (2), 419-455 ·
H.
Houba, Motchenkova E., and Q. Wen, (2012), Competitive Prices as Optimal Cartel Prices, Economics
Letters, Volume 114, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 39-42 ·
E.
Motchenkova and R. van der Laan, (2011), Strictness of leniency programs
and asymmetric punishment effect, International
Review of Economics, 58(4), Page 401-431 ·
R. Halbersma,
M. Mikkers, E. Motchenkova, and I. Seinen, (2011), Market Structure and
Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the
Netherlands, European Journal of
Health Economics, 12(6), Page 589-603 ·
H.
Houba, Motchenkova E., and Q. Wen, (2010), Antitrust enforcement with
price-dependent fines and detection probabilities, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.3 pp.
2017-2027 ·
E.
Motchenkova and D. Leliefeld, (2010), Adverse effects of leniency
programs in view of industry asymmetry, Journal of
Applied Economic Sciences, Volume V/ Issue 2(12),
115-129 ·
E.
Motchenkova, (2008), Determination of optimal penalties for
antitrust violations in a dynamic setting, European
Journal of Operational Research , 189(1), 269-291 ·
E.
Motchenkova and P.M. Kort, (2006), Analysis of the properties of the
current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,
128(2), 431-451
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