Research
Ph.D. thesis topic
Analysis of optimal policies for deterrence of violations of competition law
Supervisors
Prof. Eric van Damme and Prof. Peter M. Kort
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Analysis of the
properties of the current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law,
with Peter M.Kort, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 128(2), 431-451,
2006, URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/4430162512326843/fulltext.pdf Determination of
optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting, European
Journal of Operational Research , Volume 189(1), 269-291, 2008, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.05.048 (or http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/kubcen/200496.html) |
Promoting small-scale private enterprises in Russia: the problem of excessive taxation, Proceedings of the Workshop on Reviving Russian Economy through the restructuring of incentives, 2001. St-Petersburg, Russia, pp. 7-10
Analysis of
the properties of the current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law,
with Peter M. Kort, Proceedings of the International conference on
Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, 2004
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and Q. Wen, 2009, The
Maximal Damage Paradigm in Antitrust Regulation:
Is it Something New?, AENORM 16,
gemeenschappelijke uitgave econometriestudieverenigingen Kraket/VSAE, Vrije Universiteit/Universiteit van Amsterdam,
p.37-41.
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and Q. Wen (2008), Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-120/1, Tinbergen Institute.
R. Halbersma, M. Mikkers, E Motchenkova and I. Seinen (2007), Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer bargaining in the Netherlands, Working paper, Free University Amsterdam and TILEC, 2007, URL: TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2007-006
Motchenkova, E. and D. Leliefeld (2007), To Protect in order to Serve, adverse effects of leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry, Working paper, Free University Amsterdam and TILEC, 2007, URL: TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2007-007
Motchenkova,
E. (2006), Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat
Offenders, Working paper, Free University Amsterdam 2006-8, URL: http://ideas.repec.org/s/dgr/vuarem.html
Motchenkova, E. and R. van der Laan, (2005), Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms, CentER Discussion paper 2005-74
Motchenkova,
E. (2004), Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability, CentER
Discussion paper series 2004-98
Motchenkova, E. (2001), Promoting small-scale private enterprises in Russia: the problem of excessive taxation, mimeo
H. Houba, E.
Motchenkova and Q. Wen (2009), The Effects of Leniency Programs on Maximal
Cartel Pricing, mimeo
Y. Funaki, H. Houba and E. Motchenkova (2007), Assignment games, core and market power, mimeo
Presentation at the Rotterdam Law and Economics Center, November 14, 2006, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms
Presentation at European
Association of Law and Economics annual conference (EALE), September 14-16,
2006, Madrid, Spain
“Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms”
33th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), August 25-27, 2006, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. “Market Power and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Dutch Hospital Sector”
Presentation
at ESNIE summer workshop, May 14-20, 2006, Ajaccio, France
“Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms”
Lunch Seminar at the ACLE (University of Amsterdam), December 21, 2005, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “Existing US and EU antitrust fining practices from an optimal control perspective”
FaDo Seminar Presentation at the Free University Amsterdam, October 13, 2005, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms”
32th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), September 1-4, 2005, Porto, Portugal, “Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms”
Game Theory Festival at Stony Brook University (Law and Economics Workshop), July 8-19, 2005, Stony Brook, US, “Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability”
Third Conference of Scandinavian Association of Law and Economics "Economics of Law Enforcement", June 17-18, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark, “Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability”
10th Spring Meeting of Young Economists, April 23-24, 2005, Geneva, Switzerland, “Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability”
31th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), September 2-5, 2004, Berlin, Germany. ?The effects of leniency programs on the behavior of the firms participating in cartel agreements?
International conference on Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, June 17-20, 2004, Chalkidiki, Greece, "Analysis of the properties of the current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law?
9th Spring Meeting of Young Economists, April 23-2, 2004, Warsaw, Poland, "Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting?
Lunch Seminar at the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa), February 24, 2004, Den Haag, The Netherlands, "Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting?
NAKE Research Day, October 24th, 2003, Central Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, ?Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting?
GSS seminar, November 6th, 2003, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, ?Analysis of the current penalty schemes for antitrust violations?
Joint Competition & Cooperation / Game Theory seminar, October 19th, 2001,Tilburg University, "The Problem of Excessive Taxation and Corruption in Tax Administration of Russian Small Enterprises"
Workshop: Reviving Russian Economy through the restructuring of incentives, June 21-22, 2001, St. Petersburg, Russia, ? Promoting small-scale private enterprises in Russia: the problem of excessive taxation?