Ines Lindner

Project leader of the NWO-financed Program "Cascade Dynamics on Interaction Networks" in cooperation with VU University Amsterdam and University of Amsterdam. The aim of this project is to improve existing theories on the emergence and stability of collective behavior by explicitly modeling the development of hidden forces of action (sentiments). Towards congregation, the individual actors influence the other’s preferential attachment through their social network position. The two main research questions are: (I) What kind of networks tend to display higher volatility in collective action than others? In particular, can we explain outbreak of collective action as an endogenous property of system dynamics? (II) How can we control or at least influence collective action given a particular network architecture?

Review Essay on `Voting and Collective Decision-making' by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (Cambridge University Press), Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, Vol. 38(1), 161-179.
Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions (with Maurice Koster, Gordon McCormick, Guillermo Owen), Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, 2010, TI 2010-001/1, submitted.
A Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters, Economic Theory, 2008, Vol. 35(3), 607-611.

A Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed, Theory and Decision, 2008, Vol. 64(4), 495-518.

The Power of a Collectivity to Act in Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters, Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, Vol. 30(4) 581-601.

Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development (with Holger Strulik), Economica, 2008, Vol. 75, 244–258.

Mass-mobilization with Noisy Conditional Beliefs (with Maurice Koster, Roy Lindelauf and Guillermo Owen), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, Vol. 55(1), 55-77.

Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting, (with Guillermo Owen and Bernard Grofman), in: M. Braham; F. Steffen (eds.), Power, Freedom and Voting, 2008, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 119-138.

Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold (with Guillermo Owen), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, Vol. 53(3), 232-238.

A Simple `Market Value' Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems (with Guillermo Owen, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Leonard Ray), International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, Vol. 35(1), 111-128.

L.S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Proof of Some Special Cases (with Moshe Machover), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, Vol. 47(1), 37-49.

Distributive Politics and Economic Growth: The Markovian Stackelberg Solution (with Holger Strulik), Economic Theory, 2004, Vol. 23(2), 439-444.

Why not Africa? - Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights (with Holger Strulik), Public Choice, 2004, Vol. 120, 143-167.

Mediation as Signal (with Manfred Holler), European Journal of Law & Economics, 2004, Vol. 17(2), 165-173.

Power Measures in Large Weighted Voting Games - Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods, PhD thesis, University of Hamburg, 2004.

Comment on: “Conflict and Cooperation in Energy and Climate Change. The Framework of a Dynamic Game of Power-Value Interaction”, by Jürgen Scheffran, (with Vesa Kanniainen), 2002, in: M.J. Holler, D. Schmidtchen, M.E. Streit (eds.), Power and Fairness, Jahrbuch fϋr Neue Politische Oekonomie, Mohr Siebeck, Tϋbingen, Vol. 20, 255-258.

Nash-Gleichgewicht und Maximinlösung in gemischten Strategien (with Manfred Holler), WISU 2001, Vol. 5, 745-748 (part one), Vol. 6, 880-883 (part two).

Work in Progress

Power in Social Influence Dynamics (with Maurice Koster and Stefan Napel)

Networks and Collective Action (with Maurice Koster and Elisenda Molina)

Strategic Voting in Truth-Tracking Situations (with Guillermo Owen)