Ines Lindner










Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business Administration - Department of Econometrics & OR



Ines Lindner





Phone: +31 20 5986026
Fax:     +31 20 5986020




The prediction value, Social Choice and Welfare (with M. Koster, S. Kurz and and S. Napel), Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming 2017, (Previously TI 2013-188/2). 

Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games with Threshold Dynamics (with J. P. Huang and M. Koster), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, Vol. 84, pp.109-118, (Previously TI 2013-208/2).

From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World (with Holger Strulik), Journal of Development Economics, 2014, Vol. 109, 17-29, (Previously TI 2012-035/1).

Signalling, In: J. Backhaus (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2014, Springer, New York.

Networks and Collective Action (with Ramon Flores, Maurice Koster and Elisenda Molina), Social Networks, 2012, Vol. 34(4), 161-179, (Previously TI 2012-032/1).

Review Essay on `Voting and Collective Decision-making' by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (Cambridge University Press), Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, Vol. 38(1), 161-179.

A Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters, Economic Theory, 2008, Vol. 35(3), 607-611.

Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development (with Holger Strulik), Economica, 2008, Vol. 75, 244-258.

The Power of a Collectivity to Act in Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters, Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, Vol. 30(4) 581-601.

A Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed, Theory and Decision, 2008, Vol. 64(4), 495-518.

Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs (with Maurice Koster, Roy Lindelauf and Guillermo Owen), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, Vol. 55(1), 55-77.

Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting, (with Guillermo Owen and Bernard Grofman), 2008, in: M. Braham; F. Steffen (eds.),

Power, Freedom and Voting, Springer Verlag, Berlin, Power, Freedom and Voting, 2008, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 119-138.

Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold
(with Guillermo Owen), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, Vol. 53(3), 232-238.

A Simple "Market Value" Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems (with Guillermo Owen, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Leonard Ray), International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, Vol. 35(1), 111-128.

L.S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Proof of Some Special Cases (with Moshé Machover), Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, Vol. 47(1), 37-49.

Distributive Politics and Economic Growth: The Markovian Stackelberg Solution (with Holger Strulik), Economic Theory, 2004, Vol. 23(2), 439-444.

Why not Africa? -- Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights (with Holger Strulik), Public Choice, 2004, Vol. 120, 143-167.

Mediation as Signal (with Manfred Holler), European Journal of Law & Economics, 2004, Vol. 17,

Power Measures in Large Weighted Voting Games - Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods, PhD thesis, University of Hamburg, 2004.

Comment on: "Conflict and Cooperation in Energy and Climate Change. The Framework of a Dynamic Game of Power-Value Interaction", by Jürgen Scheffran, (with Vesa Kanniainen), 2002, in: M.J. Holler, D. Schmidtchen, M.E. Streit (eds.), Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie}, Vol. 20,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.

Nash-Gleichgewicht und Maximinlösung in gemischten Strategien (with Manfred Holler), WISU, 2001, Vol. 5, 745-748 (part one), Vol. 6, 880-883 (part two).